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VOLUME XLIII WINTER, 1963 NUMBER 1
THE CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT IN
MASSACHUSETTS
KENNETH B. HUGHES*
The central question to which this article is addressed is that raised,
but not decided, by our Supreme Judicial Court in the case of Sullivan v.
Goulette.' The Question: "Is it reasonable to continue to apply the
principle stated in the cited cases to the effect (1) that an agreement
for a contingent fee for legal services in litigation is void for champerty,
if the attorney's services will not give rise to a debt due him from the
client, and the attorney's prospective share of a recovery is to be his
only compensation, and (2) that such an agreement will not be saved
from champerty solely by an arrangement that the client is to furnish the
necessary money to pay expenses ?"
It is my position, and that of the several Massachusetts bar associations
responding to the Court's invitation to appear in the Sullivan case as
amici curiae, that the answer to that question should be "No." Or cast
affirmatively, that reason and logic support, and justice requires a forth-
right judicial validation of the contingent fee agreement in this Com-
monwealth. That such an agreement between an attorney and his
client in which the attorney looks solely to his prospective share in any
recovery for his compensation should not be void for champerty. We
would further recommend, however, that this general and long overdue
validation of the use of contingent fee contracts not extend to actions
for divorce or legal separation; nor, of course, to those actions or
proceedings wherein the legislature has provided statutory forms for
the ascertainment and award of legal fees. The several considerations
which move this view receive particular attention under appropriate
sections of this article, which follow.
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1 182 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. 1962). See Order for Reargument, dated Jan. 23, 1962.
In its final determination of the case, the court found it unnecessary to furnish a
judicial answer to a question it had raised, or to re-examine the currently applied
rule against contingent fee contracts implicit in the question. No issue is taken
with the result reached in the principal case. It is regrettable, however, that in
deciding the case upon the narrower grounds, a question vital to the administration
of justice in this Commonwealth went by default.
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I.
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AMERICAN AUTHORITY HOLDS THE
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT TO BE NEITHER IMMORAL NOR ILLEGAL
In assessing the utility and reasonableness of the currently applied
Massachusetts rule that the contract for a contingent fee for legal services
is void for champerty, it is relevant to compare the local view with
those adhered to in other jurisdictions worthy of our respect. Indeed, in
its own prior decisions relating to the contingent fee problem, this court
has consistently looked for and cited the results reached by other courts
as providing subjacent support for its own disposition of cases under
consideration. For example, ,in Holdsworth v. Healey,2 the court men-
tions England and eight American states as being in accord with the
Massachusetts view that a contingent fee contract is void for champerty,
stating further, that "our law is in accord with the great weight of
authority elsewhere, as declared in recent as well as older decisions,
although there are adjudications somewhat contrary."' It is a matter
of compelling interest to note that if Holdsworth v. Healey were up for
decision today, seven of those eight states referred to are now aligned
in favor of the contingent fee contract. Of the eight only Maine, and
there by statute, persists in the view that the contingent fee contract is
void for champerty.4
By now, it is clear that the contingent fee system, whereby the
attorney's fee is contingent upon a recovery, has received the sanction
and approval of every state in the United States, excepting only Mass-
achusetts and Maine.5 On the federal side, the contingent fee contract
for legal services received the early validation of the Supreme Court
of the United States in Taylor v. Berniss6 in the following terms:
Contracts by attorneys for compensation in prosecuting claims
against the United States are not void because the amount is made
contingent upon success, or upon the sum recovered. And the well-
known difficulties and delays in obtaining payment of just claims
justifies a liberal compensation in successful cases, where none is
to be received in case of failure3
The contingent fee contract sustained by the Supreme Court in this case
was for fifty percent of any recovery.
2 249 Mass. 436, 144 N.E. 386 (1924).
3 Id. at 439, 144 N.E. at 387.
4 Me. Rev. Stat. ch. 135, § 13 (1954).
5 For recapitulation of the judicial and legislative validation of contingent fee
contracts in the American states, see Comment, Are Contingent Fees Ethical
Where Client Is Able to Pay a Retainer, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 329, 336-37 & nn.44-47(1959). See also Contingent Fees in the United States, Inst. of Jud. Adm. of
N.Y.U., No. 5, Unit 14, p. 9 & n.62 (Apr. 22, 1957).
6 110 U.S. 42 (1884).
7 Id. at 45.
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This flat rejection by the overwhelming majority of American juris-
dictions of the doctrine of champerty as defined by the English courts
has been achieved over a long history. With enactment of the Field
Code in 1848 and its repeal of statutory fees taxable as costs (a borrow-
ing from the English system) New York validated the contingent fee
contract. By 1878, New Jersey by court action had repudiated the
ancient doctrine of champerty as "wholly unnecessary in this country."
One of the last states to recognize contingent fees was New Hampshire.
In Markarian v. Bartis,9 the New Hampshire Court considered its
earlier position on the subject and reviewed the authorities throughout
the country, and concluded: "Thus today, in this state, the mere fact
that an attorney's fees are to be contingent upon his success and are to
constitute a share of the proceeds recovered can scarcely be said to
offend the public conscience."'
By 1908, the American Bar Association had recognized the ethical
propriety of contingent fees by its original adoption of Canon 13. In
1933, Canon 13 was amended to read: "A contract for a contingent fee,
where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circum-
stances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensa-
tion, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to
its reasonableness." To date, thirty-five of the fifty American states
have signified their approval of the ABA Canons, including Canon 13
in its amended form. Twelve other states have adopted their own
canons, and have approved of the contingent fee either in those canons
or by court decision. In South Carolina, which has not adopted a set
of canons, the contingent fee contract has been likewise approved by
court decision. The District of Columbia has adopted the ABA Canons;
and Puerto Rico has adopted its own canons which recognize the pro-
priety of the contingent fee.
I would recommend, however, that this general validation of the use
of contingent fee contracts not extend to actions for divorce or legal
separation; nor, of course, to those actions or proceedings wherein the
legislature has provided statutory forms for the award and ascertain-
ment of fees. This recommended limitation upon the use of contingent
fee contracts appears to be in force in all jurisdictions which have other-
wise validated their general employment."
The Massachusetts rule against contingent fee contracts is undoubt-
edly of English origin, and no possible exception may be taken to a
8 Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N.J.L. 195 (Sup. Ct. 1878).
9 89 N.H. 370, 199 Atl. 573 (1938).
10 Id. at 374, 199 At!. at 576.
11 Newman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283, 61 Pac. 907 (1900), holding contingent fees
in divorce actions void as against public policy; Annot., 30 A.L.R. 188 (1924).
And see, e.g., The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1948), as imposing
a twenty percent limit on attorney's fees.
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citation of English authority to that fact. Aside from which, there is
also a great deal about English jurisprudence which we may be inclined
to admire. But it is equally clear that it adds nothing to the discussion
of the propriety or impropriety of contingent fee contracts in this Com-
monwealth, to note with approval that the contingent fee is illegal in
England and that the cases so hold. The English view with respect to
contingent fee contracts has nothing to do with morality, public or
private. The simple fact is that there is no need and no place for the
contingent fee contract within the complicated structure of statutes,
which operate to fix and assure the English lawyer's compensation for
legal services. It will be recalled that under the English system, the
"costs" assessed against a losing party include in almost all instances
attorney's fees. Thus the prevailing party in the English courts may
look forward to receiving, from his unsuccessful adversary, the expense
incurred on behalf of his solicitor and barrister. Further, under the
Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, as amended in 1960, large segments
of the population indigent only in the sense that financing a lawsuit
would be burdensome are entitled to have their lawyers paid by the
government. Under the 1960 amendment to this social welfare legisla-
tion, the barristers and solicitors receive 90% of what their normal
remuneration would be in a similar non-aided action.'2 The high cost
of English justice has been often noted in legal literature; the fees
awarded are excessive by American standards, particularly when the
relative real purchasing power of the dollar and the English pound is
considered.'8 Upon these facts, English "rejection" of the contingent
fee contract today relates to extrinsic considerations deeply involved in
their concept of the Bar as an arm of the Welfare State. Clearly, this
furnishes no sufficient predicate for any rejection of the contingent fee
within the American concept of judicial administration.
In summary, all American jurisdictions both state and federal, and
excepting only Maine and Massachusetts, have accepted the contingent
fee contract as a basis for compensation for legal services. And even in
Massachusetts, as we shall develop in a later section of this article, a
contingent fee contract is not viewed as per se a wrongful act.' 4 The
Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association expressly validate
both the morality and the legality of the contingent fee. All of the
treatises and casebooks on the subject of Legal Ethics which I have
been able to examine take a similar affirmative position.'" Indeed, a
thorough research of law reviews and related publications as listed in
12 Legal Aid & Advice Act, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, at 632 (1949) ; 8 & 9 Eliz.
2, c. 28 (1960).
13 To this point, Greenberger, Study of Fee Systems in England & the United
States 1-8, nn.1-5, 49 (1960), on file with the Inst. of Jud. Adm. of N.Y.U.
14 Holdsworth v. Healey, 249 Mass. 436, 144 N.E. 386 (1924).
15 See, e.g., Drinker, Legal Ethics 4-6, 176-77 (1953).
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the Index to Legal Periodicals has failed to produce a single article
advocating abolition of the contingent fee contract. All of these factors
combine strongly to support the recommendation that our Supreme
Judicial Court take occasion to declare it to be lawful for an attorney
to contract for a reasonable percentage or portion of the proceeds
realized from a client's claim or cause of action.
II.
THE CONTINGENT FEE BASIS FOR COMPENSATION CONFORMS WITH
OUR NOTIONS OF JUSTICE
The contingent fee agreement, reasonable in its terms, operates to
implement at the action level certain irreducible objects of judicial
administration to which we are constitutionally committed in this
Commonwealth. It is my firm conviction that no critical evaluation of
the contingent fee may derive from a clinging to terms which under
modern conditions are denuded of content. The bland argument that
contingent fee agreements are champertous, and therefore cannot be
countenanced, marks no constructive approach to the problem of
whether such agreements are socially desirable under our system for
the administration of justice. Under such an approach nothing is gained,
and a great deal is lost, through substitution of an ancient taboo for
logical reasoning and formulation of sound public policy. It is abund-
antly clear that neither criticism nor defense of the contingent fee rule
will have validity, unless it relates to the extent to which such rule
does or does not aid in the implementation at the action level of our
accepted notions of justice.
Deeply involved in this whole process of rule-evaluation, and affec-
tive of it at every turn, is our notion of what our idea of justice is.
Throughout his history, man seems always to have aspired to the
creation and enjoyment of some kind of just and workable order. Every
society of which we have record has at least claimed a devotion to
some idea of justice. It hardly requires mention that such ideas have
varied widely with respect to time and place, and the conditions under
which asserted. It is equally established that every society has there-
fore provided tribunals and some kind of framework of rules and
procedures, whereby right and justice according to their variable lights
might find support and expression within that political community.
The idea of justice which bears most directly and fundamentally upon
the matter at hand finds expression in the Massachusetts Constitution,
Part 1, article 11 :
Every subject of this Commonwealth ought to find a Certain
Remedy, by having recourse to the Laws, for all injuries or wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He
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ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged
to purchase it; completely, and without any denial; promptly, and
without delay; conformably to the laws.
This Constitutional mandate contemplates nothing less than the free
and easy availability of means whereby every person so injured or so
wronged may gain a fair, effective, and prompt resolution of any claim
having support in the law. To this end, the Commonwealth has provided
fair, efficient and well-ordered tribunals to settle those juridical dis-
putes brought before them. Additionally, the Commonwealth has
imposed high standards of training, craftsmanship, and moral fitness
upon those admitted to the Bar in order that the practice of legal repre-
sentation might be meaningful and entirely consistent with the objects
constitutionally declared.
The fair import of all of this is that litigation in Massachusetts is not
regarded as an evil; nor is litigiousness a vice where the litigant's claim
or defense finds support in the law. By terms of the constitutional provi-
sion, the right of the subject to "find a certain remedy, by having
recourse to the Laws, for all injuries or wrongs" which he may have
suffered, is not qualified. It applies to the man who is not able to
finance from collateral sources his necessary legal representation, as
well as the more fortunately situated citizen who is so able. If this
were not true, equality before the law would be illusory, and the
"certain remedy" of the law would be the private preserve of the eco-
nomically powerful and self-sufficient. The decision of whether a legal
claim would be pursued to a just result would not turn upon the
justness of the cause, but upon whether the claimant, however just his
cause, could actually or sensibly obligate himself to the payment of
attorney's fees regardless of outcome. For our constitutional mandate
to be meaningful at the action level, justice requires that the contingent
fee contract be validated by our court, as providing the ordinary citizen
with the only sure means of prosecuting his claims to judgment. Such
action by the court would be entirely consistent with its own expressed
view that "The constitutional mandate to maintain equality before the
law and equal laws rests upon the judicial department of government
with as much force as upon the other departments."' 16
III.
THE CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT PERFORMS A WORTHY AND
NECESSARY FUNCTION IN THE SETTLEMENT OF JURIDICAL DISPUTES
As we have seen in section I of this article the question of the ethical
propriety of contingent fee contracts was settled by the American Bar
16 Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 320; 184 N.E.
152, 161 (1933).
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Association as early as 1908, after the most careful consideration and
deliberation. And, both before and since that time, by the overwhelm-
ing approval of the contingent fee in all American jurisdictions save two.
Nor is our evaluation of the contingent fee as an effective instrument
of judicial administration, in our times, blurred by any retained part
of medieval doctrine that litigation is evil and contrary to religious
precept.17
It is equally clear that nothing will be gained, and much will be lost,
if we allow our view of the contingent fee to suffer the distorting effects
of ancient labels. To call the contingent fee contract "champertous" is
an abuse of terms, whether in the historical or in the modern sense. It
admits to a great confusion in the practices to which the doctrine
related, e.g., the solicitation and outright purchase of claims; the inter-
position of feudal lords in cases in which they had no interest; and
embracery involving direct intimidation of the court.' As applied to
the contingent fee contract under modern conditions, the term "cham-
perty" is as remote in fact as the feudal system is in time. The single
test to be applied to the worth and validity of the contingent fee agree-
ment is the extent to which it does or does not implement, at the action
level, the legitimate objects of judicial administration in our own
society. By this test, it may be fairly concluded that the use of the con-
tingent fee agreement performs a worthy and necessary function in the
settlement of juridical disputes. The several considerations which move
and support this conclusion are set forth in the following sections.
IV.
THE CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT HELPS TO ASSURE TRUE EQUALITY
BEFORE THE LAW
As earlier noted in section II of this presentation, the constitutional
mandate guaranteeing the availability of means whereby the citizen
may gain legal redress for injuries or wrongs he has suffered, is without
qualification. It runs in favor of the impecunious claimant, as well as
the most affluent. The justness of his cause, and not the ready avail-
ability of means to prosecute that cause, should be the test of whether
a person pursues the remedial action which the law provides. Life for
the average person in our modern society is a risky, complicated, and
expensive business. It is equally clear that the law, as it always has,
reflects the complexity of the society it serves. The new and added
risks of injury or wrong to which the citizen is exposed have led to the
17 Mass. Const. part I, art. 11; Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 Calif. L.
Rev. 48, 70 (1935).
18 Radin, op. cit. supra note 17, at 66.
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creation of whole new bodies of law, and the reach of earlier laws has
been extended to afford him redress under changed conditions.
All of this response of the law to new and changed conditions would
be without meaning unless there were also provided sensible access for
the average person to the processes of the law. It is no mere coinci-
dence that general acceptation of the contingent fee agreement in other
American jurisdictions came, in point of time, with the machine age-
with its multitude of casualties to a new and relatively impecunious
class of litigant. Indeed, the ultimate justification for the use of the
contingent fee agreement is that it provides a substantial majority of
those injured or wronged with the only opportunity they will have to
prosecute their legal claims through the normal and recommended
channels of legal representation. Faced with the same pervasive prob-
lem, and rejecting the contingent fee idea, the English Bar was pro-
pelled into becoming a handmaiden of the Welfare State; with their
fees from "assigned" cases payable from public funds.19 It is submitted
that this English "solution" to the problem of meaningful legal repre-
sentation is not one to' find favor in this Commonwealth.
V.
THE CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT ENABLES THE CLAIMANT TO SECURE
THE SERVICES OF COUNSEL POSSESSED OF THE REQUISITE SKILL AND
LEARNING
I have noted that the contingent fee agreement constitutes for the
truly indigent person the only available means open to him for legal
representation. But the contingent fee arrangement serves other seg-
ments of the population equally well. Because a person is solvent in the
technical sense of the term furnishes no predicate for judicial assumption
that he will be in a position to pay a fixed and irretrievable fee, for the
kind and quality of legal representation his claim may demand. Through
the contingent fee arrangement, the person of average means is able to
be represented by counsel of his choice, unaffected by personal economic
limitations. This exercise of the freedom of choice in the selection of
counsel by claimants is beneficial to the Bar as a whole. It encourages
lawyers to advance their learning and perfect their skills, in order to
merit their selection by claimants having this competitive advantage of
unrestricted choice. Speaking to this point, the Supreme Court of
Colorado has noted:
[A] claimant requires the assistance of counsel possessed of skill
and learning. The insurer in such cases usually is represented by
very able and expert counsel, and in the administration of justice a
19 Legal Aid & Advice Act, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, at 632 (1949) ; 8 & 9 Eliz.
2, c. 28 (1960).
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measure of equality in ability of counsel representing the litigants
is a great aid in arriving at a just solution of the issues involved.20
VI.
THE CONTINGENT FEE, LIKE ALL OTHER FEES, MUST MEET THE
TEST OF REASONABLENESS
Clearly, a contingent fee and an excessive fee are not convertible
terms. As Professor Radin pointed out, in the case law and complaints
before grievance committees of the Bar, there have been as many com-
plaints of excessive fees which were not dependent upon the result of
litigation, as of those which were so dependent.21 The spectre of over-
reaching appears to be omnipresent in any consideration of the practice
of law. The point to be made is, whether a fee is fair or whether it is
unconscionable bears no necessary or demonstrable dependence upon
the method of fee ascertainment used in the particular case. The occa-
sional unscrupulous lawyer bent upon taking unfair advantage of his
client in the matter of fees will do so, whether he is working upon a
fixed fee, a retainer, or a contingency. The contingent fee agreement
offers a further valuable protection to the client against overcharging,
in that any fee claimed must be related to success achieved in the
matter represented. Fixed fee contracts do not have this built-in pro-
tection against machinations of the overreaching lawyer. Fortunately,
cases of actual overreaching are rarely encountered; and where they
are, adequate procedures are available to test the reasonableness of the
fee.
In my judgment, to condemn the contingent fee agreement out of
hand as "champertous" is to subsume that by its nature such fee must
be excessive and unconscionable. As I have shown, such an argument
against the contingent fee has no support in logic or experience. Today,
it draws its sole "support" from a spate of designedly misleading articles,
such as that which appeared under the title "When the Lawyer Gets the
Spoils."22 It is my position that in looking at the worth and validity of
any agreement for legal fees, whether fixed or upon a contingency, our
court should exercise its judgment with respect to the particular case,
and the circumstances involved. The court should not indulge in judg-
ment by category; that no fee arrangement is either good or bad, in
itself; that the test to be applied is as to its reasonableness under all the
circumstances, and the extent to which the fee arrangement operates to
enable a just result in the given cause.23
20 Cline v. Warrenberg, 109 Colo. 497, 126 P.2d 1030 (1942).
21 Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 587, 591 (1940).
2 Readers Digest, Mar. 1960; see reply by John D. Randall, then president of
the American Bar Association, with its well-reasoned refutation of the smears
and innuendos in the Digest article, in 31 Okla. B.A.J. 1189-91 (1960).
23 Cf. ABA Canons of Ethics 12 & 13.
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VII.
THE CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT PROMOTES THE NON-JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF LEGAL DISPUTES, TAKING A BURDEN OFF THE COURTS
I have previously noted the salutary effect of the contingent fee agree-
ment upon the just resolution of legal disputes in those matters brought
before the courts, by providing equality before the law through access
to meaningful legal representation. It is clear that the contingent fee
agreement, by making legal representation available at the earliest stages
of pre-litigative negotiation, has brought about one of the most signifi-
cant features of the -modern practice of law. This is the uniquely
American procedure under which the overwhelming majority of all
juridical claims that lawyers are retained to press, are ultimately dis-
posed of by negotiated settlement without assuming the form of litigation.
The motor vehicle tort field in Massachusetts offers a striking illus-
tration of this sharp trend toward out-of-court settlement of claims-
a trend that parallels the increased percentage of lawyer representation
from the time the claim is filed with the insurance carrier. For example,
during the years 1941-1942 in all Massachusetts courts having cogni-
zance of motor vehicle tort cases, 37,262 such cases were commenced.
During the years 1957-1958, this number of filings fell below 29,000.
Within this same sixteen year period, it is conservatively estimated that
the number of motor vehicle tort cases responding to negotiated settle-
ment increased twenty-fold. 24
Information informally supplied by some of the largest carriers of
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance in Massachusetts indicates
that about 200,000 third-party claims were filed against them in 1960;
and that sixty-five to seventy percent of the claimants were represented
by counsel at the time the claim was filed; this percentage of repre-
sentation marking a sharp and constant increase over past years. The
conclusion is inescapable that in Massachusetts as in all other jurisdic-
tions, and regardless of the subtle and delicate refinements of language
imposed by the local rule now under re-examination, these cases are
negotiated to settlement under a contingent fee arrangement of one
kind or another. It is equally clear that the contingent fee agreement is
a matter of vital necessity in this area of negotiated settlements. With-
out such agreements as to fees contingent upon success in the matter,
most claimants would be deprived of the right of legal representation
at this vital stage. The law favors settlements, and a just settlement
most often depends upon the earliest fact-investigation and legal evalua-
tion of the claim. Indeed, the quality of proof and degree of persuasion
required to effect a just settlement is likely to be greater' when tried to
24 See Field, Administration of Justice, Ann. Survey of Mass. Law (1954-1955).
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the carrier, than when tried to the jury. Since the jury stands relatively
indifferent to the verdict, while the insurance company stands to pay
any settlement it is persuaded to approve.2
In the motor vehicle tort field, the contingent fee is directly related
to and reflects the highly "contingent" nature of the claim itself. Aside
from the usual failures of proof, the pervasive effect of contributory
negligence and like defenses is to make any recovery highly speculative
from the standpoint of both claimant and attorney. Locally, I am told,
about forty percent of all such claims are rejected in full by the carriers.
While local statistics are lacking and unavailable, it is a fair estimate
based upon the velocity of such claims and total awards paid, that the
average settlement reached in personal injury claims does not exceed
seven hundred dollars, with the median at less than five hundred
dollars. These estimates compare favorably with those reached in a
New York City survey of claims settled without suit.20
The Bar should be encouraged to continue to provide expert repre-
sentation for claimants at the negotiatory stage for these relatively small
claims, which usually admit of settlement without court action. Other-
wise, claimants would be at the mercy of the carriers who in every
instance are represented by able counsel. Justice requires, and sound
principles of judicial administration clearly sustain, the validation of
the contingent fee agreement as a necessary adjunct to the negotiated
settlement of claims.
VIII.
THE CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENT PROVIDES A FAIR AND EQUITABLE
BASIS FOR THE VALUATION OF LEGAL SERVICES
The question of what a lawyer's services are reasonably worth is a
pervasive problem, and admits of no general answer. This problem of
valuation is not solely or uniquely related to the contingency fee agree-
ment. The question is raised, and must be met, in every kind of fee
arrangement open to the attorney and his client. In every case where
legal representation is sought and accepted, it must be assumed that
both attorney and client believe they have a just cause, and a chance of
winning. It is highly relevant to consider, in general, what counsel for
a claimant undertakes to do when he accepts the case, because this will
have an important bearing as to when, and upon what basis, a reason-
able valuation may be placed upon his services in the matter.
25 For reports of similar experience and conclusions in Ohio, see Comment,
Are Contingent Fees Ethical Where Client Is Able to Pay a Retainer, 20 Ohio
St. L.J. 329, 344 (1959) ; in New Jersey, Report of Court Administrator for 1955.
26 Closing Statement Survey, The Project for Effective Justice, Colum. Univ.
Law School (1958): For suits, the median recovery was $725; for claims, the
median was $575. The averages were: for suits, $2,058; for claims, $912.
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In almost every instance, the attorney is involved in the factual re-
construction of some past event, the precise nature and happening of
which is the basis of the claim. Ultimately, he must persuade the
tribunal (court, agency board, or claims department) by every ethical
procedure the law provides, that his competing version of the facts is
the true one; that his theory of the law applicable is correct; and that
justice requires the result for which he contends. At what stage of
this complicated and exhaustive undertaking, if ever, may his charge
for services be fixed with some semblance of accuracy? How do we
value professional skill and judgment in a given case? Obviously, there
is no magic formula to cover any situation so elusive on the facts, and
fraught with so many intangibles. No fee, however set, can make any
claim to mathematical certainty as it relates to the question of its fair-
ness under all the circumstances. Every fee, contingent or otherwise,
represents no more than the best judgment to the matter by those most
closely connected with the case, the attorney and his client.
As I have stated, the decision to press a claim must proceed upon an
assumption jointly held by the claimant and his attorney that the cause
is a just one, and that they have a reasonable chance of winning. Cast
in other terms, the probability of successful outcome is and should be
a significant factor in their thinking. Otherwise, the case qualifies as no
more than a vexatious proceeding which the law will not countenance.27
It is at this point that the rationality of the contingent fee agreement is
perfectly apparent. United as they are in their commitment to pursue
every ethical procedure to achieve the successful outcome which justice
would support, there can be nothing unnatural or improper in the
assumption that payment of fees should be as contingent as the result.
That this is the reasoned view of the overwhelming majority of claim-
ants and lawyers is no longer open to doubt. Every statistical survey
that has come to our attention confirms it.
28
It is worthy of note that every local bar association in this Common-
wealth which publishes minimum fee schedules, makes provision therein
for the handling of tort claims on a contingent fee basis, in that the
lawyer's compensation is related'to a stated percentage of the recovery.
While these expressed views of lawyers and clients they serve may not
be determinative of the issue, such singular unanimity of opinion offers
27 ABA Canons of Ethics. Canon 30 states that a lawyer must decline to con-
duct a civil case that is intended merely to harass or injure the other party.
28 See, e.g., Comment, Are Contingent Fees Ethical Where Client Is Able to
Pay a Retainer, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 329, 344 (1959) (survey among Ohio lawyers
and judges) : "contingent fee almost unchallenged among those polled"; also, 1955
Report of Hudson County Bar Association to Supreme Court of New Jersey re
Canon 13, to the effect that contingent fee used in at least 95% of tort cases tried
in New Jersey Courts.
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the strongest support to the basic reasonableness of the contingent fee
concept.2
In an earlier section of this article, the point was made that the con-
tingent fee and an excessive fee are not convertible terms. The test to
be applied with respect to any fee, contingent or fixed, is its reasonable-
ness under all the circumstances. It is clear that as to the contingent
fee, no question of reasonableness may be raised in the case where no
recovery has been effected, since the lawyer takes nothing for his
effort. Under fixed fee arrangements, to the contrary, the reasonable-
ness of the fee is always issuable whether the case is won or lost-and
particularly, if the loss may be ascribed to a lack of skill or judgment.
In such cases, the element of fairness runs clearly to the side of the
contingent fee, over the fixed fee contract.
Amateur critics of the contingent fee profess to find a great arbitrari-
ness, and therefore inherent unreasonableness, in the application of
standardized fixed percentages to the amount of recovery as the basis
for a fee.30 This admits to a great confusion about the contingent fee,
and the unexpressed criteria upon which it is based. Under Canon 12 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics six criteria are stated as proper to
consider in determining the amount of any fee for legal services. It is
important to note that the contingent fee takes into necessary account
every single one of the six criteria listed; including three of extreme
significance: the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the services; and the contingency or cer-
tainty of the compensation.3
1
Available statistics indicate that the percentages customarily applied
under contingent fee agreements run from 20% to 50%, with the
average around 30% for all cases. 32 This sliding scale of percentage
takes into account whether the matter was settled without litigation,
after or during trial, or involved an appeal. What does this mean in
terms of actual compensation received? First, we must set to one side,
but always keep in mind, the thirty to forty percent of cases taken on
a contingency in which there is no recovery, and thus no fee at all.
Then we proceed to the claims taken on contingency which are settled
by negotiation with the insurance carriers, without the aid of court
action. In a preceding section it was noted that the average personal
injury claim was settled by local carriers for less than seven hundred
dollars, with the median at less than five hundred dollars. With forty
29 See Minimum Fee Schedule, 1962 Mass. Lawyer's Diary; also, McCracken,
Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 Va. L.
Rev. 399 (1951), prepared for the ABA Survey of the Legal Profession.
30 See, e.g., Bloom, When the Lawyer Gets the Spoils, Reader's Digest, Mar.
1960.
31 ABA Canon 12, §§ 4 & 5.
32 Report of Survey, Inst. of Jud. Am. of N.Y.U. (Apr. 27, 1957).
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percent of all such claims entered being rejected totally by the insur-
ance companies. Next, what about the claims taken on contingency
which actually go to trial? Here, the information available is even
more illuminating. During 1954 and 1955 the Judicial Council of this
Commonwealth collected statistics on the size of verdicts taken. The
Judicial Council reported that in 1953-1954 the plaintiff received either
nothing or less than five hundred dollars in more than half the cases
tried to a conclusion. In the Superior Court in 1954-1955 jury verdicts
for plaintiffs were taken in 878 cases; the recovery being less than five
hundred dollars in 25% of the cases, and less than one thousand dollars
in 45% of the cases. In his evaluation of these reports of the Judicial
Council, Professor Field of the Harvard Law School concludes "it seems
fair to assume, moreover, that the likely amount of the plaintiff's recov-
ery in the cases he lost was at least as low as the actual recovery in
those he won."33
With respect to the dollar dimensions of recoveries taken in personal
injury cases, the New York experience is substantially similar to that
in Massachusetts. In its 1958 survey of personal injury litigation in
New York City, the Project for Effective Justice, of Columbia Uni-
versity Law School concludes:
Although the recoveries ran as high as $132,500, modest size was
characteristic of the overwhelming majority of the 3,000 case
sample. This is true whether the recovery came with or without
suit. Only 8.9% of the cases grossed more than $3,000; and only
29.7% grossed more than $1,000. Nearly half (47.2%) showed
recoveries of less than $600; and about one-fourth (24.4%) less
than $300.34
These figures provide explanation for the fact that during the past ten
years, in the face of mounting taxes and costs of living and doing busi-
ness, lawyer income has increased only 46%, compared with an increase
for the medical profession of 148% for the same period. 85
All of this admits to but one fair conclusion: in meeting his overriding
responsibility of providing equality before the law for a large propor-
tion of our population who would otherwise be deprived of their right
to legal representation, the lawyer working on a contingent fee basis
receives consistently less for his contribution than justice would seem to
require. In the great generality of cases so handled, his actual com-
pensation falls far short of that which the fixed fee would reasonably
88 30th Report Judicial Council of Massachusetts Ila; Field, Annual Survey of
Massachusetts Law 244 (1955).
34 Closing Statement Survey, The Project for Effective Justice, Colum. Univ.
Law School (1958).
85 See Canon 12: In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overesti-
mate their advice and: services, as well as those which underestimate them.
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contemplate for cases involving the same complexity and extensive
service. Adding to this the high incidence of cases in which there is
no recovery at all, it is clear that any generalized objection to the con-
tingent fee as to its demonstrated "fairness" is without merit.86 To the
contrary, the contingent fee agreement does provide a fair and equitable
basis for the valuation of legal services. The cases of actual overreach-
ing are extremely rare, and where encountered, adequate procedures are
available to test the reasonableness of the fee charged. 7
Ix.
FORTHRIGHT JUDICIAL VALIDATION OF CONTINGENT FEE AGREEMENTS
IS URGENTLY REQUIRED TO DISPEL EXISTING UNCERTAINTY AND
CONFUSION IN THE CURRENTLY APPLIED RULES
The problem of the contingent fee agreement is one which all Ameri-
can jurisdictions have had to face. And the vote has been overwhelm-
ingly in favor of validation of the contingent fee, not as any regrettable
retreat from a loftier standard, but as an institution which serves a
useful and necessary purpose in the administration of justice under
modern conditions. Massachusetts, to the contrary, has persisted in an
adherence to the ancient idea that the contingent fee agreement is
champertous, but has sought to achieve some semblance of liberalizing
effect by hedging that idea about with fine distinctions. This approach,
reflected in more than one hundred years of local jurisprudence, has
failed in not meeting the issues squarely, and for the reason that the dis-
tinctions drawn are tenuous and abstruse, and the limitations imposed
bear no visibile relation to the contingent fee idea in our times.
From the case-law on the subject, it is clear that an agreement for a
contingent fee for legal services is deemed void for champerty in Massa-
chusetts, if the attorney's services will not give rise to a debt due him
from the client and the attorney's prospective share of a recovery is
agreed to be his only compensation.38 Despite the undoubted accuracy
and seeming clarity of this judicial statement of the Massachusetts rule,
it provides no measure of the uncertainty and frustration which at-
taches to its application at the practice level, nor of its irrationality,
when tested by the legitimate objects of judicial administration.
Quite obviously, rules in governance of fee contract arrangements
between a lawyer and his client do not operate in a vacuum. Faced with
a client who has a just though highly contingent claim to press, and
36 Reply to Reader's Digest article by ABA President John H. Randall, 31
Okla. B.A.J. 1189-91 (1960).
37 See, e.g., Smith v. Weeks, 252 Mass. 244, 147 N.E. 676 (1925), fee agreement
held not champertous; case remanded to determine reasonableness of fee to be
allowed.
38 Stated effect of the case law, by our court in its Order for Reargument, supra
note 1.
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who is unable or sensibly unwilling to risk more than the bare expenses
of litigation, the Massachusetts lawyer for his own protection must
produce a fee agreement which will at once avoid the taint of champerty,
and yet conform to the felt needs of his client. As soon as the client
learns that the agreement by its terms must give rise to a "debt" for
legal services, and that the attorney's prospective share of a recovery
must not be his only compensation, the client's immediate reaction is
predictable. But assuming sufficient acuity and drafting skill are
brought to bear upon the problem, a fee arrangement may be worked
out that is wholly contingent in effect if not in form. And such may
conform with the letter if not with the spirit of the out-worn rule against
champerty locally applied. Equality before the law will have been made
available to the necessitous client. But the lawyer must speculate upon
the rationality of a rule which has been wholly rejected as antiquated
and incongruous in forty-eight other American states, in the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and all courts under the federal system. The
client, contemplating the legal circuities seemingly required to achieve
what in his mind is only a matter of simple justice, is quite likely to carry
away with him an unfavorable image of the law and all its works. It
is submitted that these stated conclusions find ample support in the
local case-law to the question.
Under Massachusetts authority, the taint of champerty will not be
deemed to attach to a fee contract otherwise contingent in form, under
any of the following conditions. (1) If the attorney has a- direct or
indirect personal interest in the thing to be recovered, or if he had
reasonable ground to believe he had such an interest although he was
not in fact so interested.39 (2) If the action does not involve or con-
template suit or other antagonistic proceeding. 40 (3) If the services
called for are of a commercial nature.41
Aside from those above-mentioned areas as wholly excluded from
operation of the rule against champerty, certain other opportunities
are open to avoid its impact. For example, the lawyer may elect to
have the client agree to pay him a small retainer in a specified amount,
and a stated percentage of the sums recovered. They may be open to
some question, but such an agreement was validated in Walsh v.
White.42 Also, a contract to receive a percentage of the recovery may
be sustained where the fact of there being a recovery is certain (e.g.,
condemnation taking of client's land by railroad) and it is only the
amount of the fee which is contingent.43
39 Reed v. Chase, 238 Mass. 83, 130 N.E. 257 (1921).
40 Manning v. Sprague, 148 Mass. 18, 18 N.E. 673 (1888).
41 Joy v. Metcalf, 161 Mass. 514, 37 N.E. 671 (1894).
42 275 Mass.'247, 175 N.E. 499 (1931).
43 Taylor v. Rosenberg, 219 Mass. 113, 106 N.E. 603 (1914).
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In the much cited case of Bloisdell v. Ahern,4 4 the tenuousness of the
stated requirement that the fee agreement must put the client under a
debt to the attorney was completely exposed. The contract provided
"whereas, said counsel and attorney are to depend upon the contingency
of success for the fees for all services rendered" and that Said counsel
employed "shall, in view of the uncertainty of the result in their pay-
ment be entitled to very large and liberal fees, in no event to exceed
fifty percent of the amount collected." The court found the contract
valid, on the ground that if successful in the suit, the attorney could
have maintained an action for his fees in a very large and liberal amount,
and that there was no actual agreement that the attorney should receive
a share of the amount recovered as compensation. As the court reasoned,
The contract under consideration was nothing more than an agree-
ment by the plaintiff to give his services without charge if the suit
should not be successful, and an agreement by the defendant to pay
large and liberal fees if successful; and we know no authority and
no reason in public policy why, under the relations and circum-
stances of the parties, it was not a lawful contract which they had a
right to enter into.45
In essence, upon the authority of Blaisdell v. Ahern, supra, a contingent
fee in Massachusetts is champertous only if it is agreed that it is to be
paid solely from the amount recovered, without any personal liability of
the client. If the client is personally-though contingently in fact-
liable, the agreement is valid. Under this view, a fee contract providing
for the personal liability of the client in an amount equal to a stated
percentage of the net amount collected is likewise valid.46
From the foregoing, it is reasonable to conclude as I do that the
currently applied Massachusetts rule in governance of contingent fee
contracts has reduced itself, in large part, to a sheer exercise in semantics
and strained construction of language. The imposed requirement of the
local rule, that a contingent fee contract to be valid must give rise to an
extrinsic "debt" running from client to attorney, bears no visible rela-
tion to any protective interest sought to be asserted. If the thrust of the
requirement is directed against the bringing of vexatious suits, it is
shadow-boxing against an asserted evil which in our society finds its
sole support in the assertion itself, and not in any demonstration of the
fact either in Massachusetts, or in those other American jurisdictions
having proven and satisfactory experience with the contingent fee
agreement. "The Laws Against Witches," said Selden, "do not prove
44 144 Mass. 393, 11 N.E. 681 (1887).
45 Id. at 395, 11 N.E. at 684.
40 See Radin, Contingent Fees in California, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 587, 589 (1940);
Note, Lawyer's Tightrope-Use and Abuse of Fees, 41 Cornell L.Q. 683, 687
(1956), for critical references to Blaisdell v. Ahern, 144 Mass. 393, 11 N.E. 681(1887), and Scott v. Harmon, 109 Mass. 237 (1872).
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that there be any." If our rule is directed against the purchase of
interests in litigation, or solicitation of claims, or agreements to bear
the expenses of litigation, it achieves no such purpose by mistaking
the contingent fee agreement as the object of difficulty. These forms of
lawyer misconduct are not convertible either in terms or effect with the
contingent fee idea.
47
Added to the general ineptness of the locally applied rule under
examination, it has proven itself to be neither just, nor workable-thus
failing to satisfy either of the twin tests customarily required of a rule
of procedure. The rule is not workable, because in the event the lawyer
has been able to negotiate the semantic tight-rope, and provide for a
"debt" running to him from the client as our rule requires, there is
little likelihood that such provision will ever have legal effect. Under
these circumstances the lawyer is under no legal obligation to enforce
the "debt," and in good conscience will refuse to do so. First, because
any such paper obligation thus created is contrary to the real objects
and purposes of the fee contract; and further, because in the great gen-
erality of cases such enforcement effort would be an exercise in futility
by reason of the impecuniousness of the client. Litigation under these
circumstances would be clearly vexatious, and contrary to the rules of
professional conduct.48
That our rule has produced grave injustices is beyond doubt. Osten-
sibly directed against vexatious litigation, the rule has operated to deny
recovery of fees in cases where the cause was clearly just, where the
attorney had prosecuted the claim with great skill and judgment, and
gained the successful result for his client which justice required. Any
rule which operates under these circumstances to deny a fee recovery,
and to label an ethical, conscientious attorney a-champertor is a perver-
sion of justice as we understand the term in our times.
It may be fairly concluded that the Massachusetts rule under re-
examination finds no support in reason or logic. That as a vestigial
remnant of an outgrown past, it has only time on its side as the sole
argument for its retention. Under many circumstances, stare decisis
is a useful and necessary force in the administration of justice. But this
doctrine does not prevent re-examination and correction of principles
previously declared, to the end that the law may better conform to the
ideas of justice in the society it serves. Any contrary view would be
worse than a mere unreasoned response to the status quo; it would
admit to a great confusion between the distinctly subsidiary rule itself,
47 See ABA Canons of Ethics, 10, 13, 28 and 42, maintaining careful distinction
between these separate and unrelated matters: Acquiring Interest in Litigation;
Contingent Fees; Stirring Up Litigation; Bearing Expenses of Litigation.
48 ABA Canon 14: lawsuits with clients should be resorted to only to prevent
injustice or fraud.
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and the irreducible objects of judicial administration to which the rule
to be valid must relate.
In the last analysis, responsibility for the charging of reasonable
fees-whether by way of fixed amount, retainer, or on contingency-
should be placed, first upon the lawyer himself, with an expectation of
honorable conduct; and second, on those bodies primarily responsible
for enforcing the Canons of Professional Ethics; with recourse to the
courts always available to any contested issue of the reasonableness of
any fee charged.
